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"TEMPTATION'S PAGE FLIES OUT THE DOOR":
NAVIGATING COMPLEX SYSTEMS OF
DISABILITY AND THE LAW FROM A
THERAPEUTIC JURISDICTION PERSPECTIVE
Michael L. Perlin, Esq & Mehgan Gallagher,Esq.t
INTRODUCTION

Disabilities systems are complex. Legal systems are complex. When
the two are combined, the complexity is increased exponentially. Remarkably, there has been little scholarly attention paid to this important phenomenon. In this paper, we consider some of the difficulties of navigating two
targets that often seem to be moving in opposite directions, of addressing a
question that, to the best of our knowledge, has never previously been addressed. Consider these preliminary thoughts. For these purposes, "the law"
includes many different areas: criminal law and procedure (among others,
the relationship between mental disability and the incompetency status, the
insanity defense, sentencing, and statuses such as that of one being a persistent sex offender); civil rights law (the rights of persons with disabilities to
adequate treatment, to aftercare, to refuse the imposition of unwanted antipsychotic medication, and the scope of anti-discrimination law); international
human rights law (its interrelationship with domestic law and the extent to
which the latter needs to be modified if it conflicts with the former); benefits law (social welfare, veterans' laws, more), and the relationship between
mental disabilities and other areas of the law (family law, private civil law
[separately, looking at tort law, contracts law, trusts and estates law], sexual
autonomy, and others).1
t Michael L. Perlin, Esq. is a Professor Emeritus at Law at New York Law School
and an Adjunct Professor at the Emory University School of Law. He is the Founding
Director of the International Mental Disability Law Reform Project, and Co-Founder of
the Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates. Mehgan Gallagher, Esq. is a Law
Fellow at the O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at the Georgetown
University Law Center. Portions of this article were written during the time when one of
the co-authors (Mr. Perlin) was an international visiting scholar at RMIT Law School,
Melbourne, Australia, March-April 2017. An earlier draft was presented by the same
co-author as a "master class" to the School of Social and Political Science, University
of Melbourne, April 5, 2017. Our thanks to Professor Penny Weller for inspiring this
piece.
1. For an overview of most of these as they relate to mental disability, see generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL
AND CRIMrNAL (3d ed. 2018).
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For these purposes, "disability" also includes many different statuses:
from one perspective, psychosocial disability, intellectual disability, those
with dual diagnoses; from another, the extent and the severity of the disability, and its impact on the person in question; from yet another, whether the
person with a disability is in the community or an institution (or, if in the
community, in danger of being institutionalized). 2 One example of conflict:
antidiscrimination law can make it unlawful for an employer to refuse to
hire someone with a disability, but many governments will only provide
benefits (including health care and insurance) if a person proves complete
disability, thus prohibiting him or her from working. 3 Anti-discrimination
laws are based on social models of disability; social benefits laws often on
the (discarded-in-international-law) medical model. 4 Virtually no attention
has been paid to these conflicts in cases involving criminal prosecutions.
Making this assignment even more challenging is an assumption that
governs much of the literature about the relationship between these two
systems: that when questions of disability are considered in the context of
the legal system, the person at risk has counsel that is competent to represent her. This is the ultimate assumption of a fact-not-in-evidence; it is
one that one of the co-authors (Mr. Perlin) has written about in many other
contexts, 5 but has never before considered in this sense.
2. It is also necessary to consider-in the broader context-the impact of the law
on persons who are treated or perceived as being disabled, but who, in fact, are not. See,
e.g., Thomas N. Abbott, Kaplan and Regarded As: Does the ADA Discriminatebetween

Real and Perceived Disability, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 883, 883 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. (2012), as interpreted in Street v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 188 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2016).
4. See, e.g., Karen Andreasian et al., Revisiting S.C.P.A 17-A: Guardianshipfor
People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 18 CUNY L. REV. 287, 288
(2015); Michael L. Perlin, "Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind":
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilitiesand the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REv. 1159, 1173 (2013).

5. See, e.g., Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, "Farfrom the Turbulent
Space": Considering the Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of IndividualsAccused of Being Sexually Violeni Predators, 18 U. PA. J. L. & SOC'L CHANGE 125

(2015)

[hereinafter Cucolo & Perlin, Turbulent Space]; Heather Ellis Cucolo &

Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Dignity and Preventing Shame and Humiliation by Improving the Quality and Education of Attorneys in Sexually Violent Predator(SVP)
Civil Commitment Cases, 28 FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 291 (2017) [hereinafter Cucolo
& Perlin, Promoting Dignity]; Alison J. Lynch & Michael L. Perlin, "Life's Hurried
Tangled Road": A Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis of Why Dedicated Counsel Must
Be Assigned to Represent Persons with Mental Disabilities in Community Settings, 35
BEHAV. SCi. & L. 353 (2017); Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend, My Doctor!

2018-2019]

Therapeutic Jurisdiction

We believe that any conclusions we come to must be filtered through
the reality that (1) many individuals with disabilities have no counsel at all
(for multiple legal, political, social, and cultural reasons), and (2) many of
the lawyers who represent these individuals do an obscenely inadequate job,
7
6
whether the case is a civil commitment matter, a death penalty sentencing,
or a guardianship case,8 to posit three disparate examples. By way of examples, in a recent article contrasting counsel in traditional civil commitment
cases and in problem-solving mental health courts, Mr. Perlin characterized
many lawyers in the traditional court setting as "bored or contemptuous [of
their clients]." 9 Stephen Bright, one of the pre-eminent death penalty lawyers of the modem era, has said flatly that "[t]he death penalty will too
often be punishment not for committing the worst crime, but for being as-

Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got": The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to
Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. Rev. 735, 736 (2005) [hereinafter Perlin,
Best Friend];Michael L. Perlin, FatalAssumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of
Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1992) [hereinafter
Perlin, FatalAssumption]; Michael L. Perlin, "I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be
Your Funeral,My Trial": A Global Perspective on the Right to Counsel in Civil Coimitment Cases, and Its Implicationsfor Clinical Legal Education, 28 WASH. U. J. L. &
SOC'L POL'Y 241 (2008) [hereinafter Perlin, Your Funeral];Michael L. Perlin, "The
Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden": The Role of Counsel and the Courts in
Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin, Executioner's Face]; Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, "Is It More than Dodging
Lions and Wastin' Time"? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the
Judicial Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB.

POL'Y & L. 114 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin & Dorfman, Wastin' Time].
6. See, e.g., Perlin, Your Funeral,supra note 5, at 241.
7. See, e.g., Perlin, Executioner's Face, supra note 5, at 201.
8. See, e.g., Winsor C. Schmidt, Guardianshipfor Vulnerable Adults in North Dakota: Recommendations Regarding Unmet Needs, Statutory Efficacy, and Cost Effectiveness, 89 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 77, 77 (2013).
9. Michael L. Perlin, "Who Will Judge ihe Many When the Game is Through?":
Considering the Profound Differences between Mental Health Courts and "Traditional" Involuntary Civil Commitment Courts, 41 SEATYLE U. L. REV. 937, 938 (2018)
[hereinafter Perlin, Who Will Judge]. Mr. Perlin had occasion to speak to private counsel who had been assigned to represent a patient in a county in which the New Jersey
Division of Mental Health Advocacy [which the author then directed] . . . did not represent patients. The assigned counsel asked [the author], "Why is the State wasting
money to pay me to do this bullshit?" Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "Mr. Bad
Example ": Why Lawyers Need to Embrace Therapeutic Jurisprudenceto Root Out Sanism in'the Representation of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 16 Wyo. L. REv. 299,
314 n.96 (2016) [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Mr. Bad Example].
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signed the worst lawyer."' 0 Additionally, the reporters are replete with cases
in which lawyers in guardianship cases provided pitifully inadequate counsel. I" In this paper, we will attempt to "tease out" some of the main threads
in this discourse in the following manner.
First, we will consider the hopelessness of conceptualizing "law" as a
single system, especially when it comes to dealing with questions of disability, using the topic of criminal incompetency as an example,' 2 and then
looking at these questions in the specific context of international human
rights law.' 3 Then, we will look at the futility of seeking to create a uniform
view of a "disability" system, as that phrase has little meaningful content,
given the range of disabilities, the range of attitudes towards persons with
different disabilities, and the futility of trying to come up with a single
formulation that would cover individuals in the community and those institutionalized.' 4 After this, we will consider the role of lawyers in both of
these systems, and how the "wild card" of sanism ultimately controls the
5
extent to which these two systems can ever be meaningfully navigated.1
Finally, we will consider the potential impact of the school of law and policy known as "therapeutic jurisprudence," and how a turn to therapeutic
16
jurisprudence might, optimally, offer us a solution.
10. Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery - Procedural Bar of Constitutional
Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92
W. VA. L. REv. 679, 695 (1990). Mr. Perlin discusses many of these cases in MICHAEL
L.

PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE STATES

(2013) and in Michael L. Perlin et al. "A World of Steel-Eyed Death": An Empirical
Evaluation of the Failure of the Strickland Standard to Ensure Adequate Counsel to
Defendants with Mental DisabilitiesFacing the Death Penalty, U. MiCH. J.L. REFORM

(forthcoming 2019), available at <https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
3332730>.
11. See, e.g., In re Lichtenstein, 652 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1996), as discussed in

A. Frank Johns, Three Rights Make Strong Advocacy for The Elderly in Guardianship:
Right to Counsel, Right to Plan, and Right to Die, 45 S.D. L.

REV.

492, 497-98 (2000).

In some cases, however, in spite of patent inadequacy, guardianship findings are affirmed. See, e.g., In re Guardianship and Custody of Angela Marie N., 636 N.Y.S.2d
758 (A.D. 1996) (counsel for a parent whose rights were terminated exhibited reasonable competence, and the parent did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, even
though counsel chose not to offer evidence or delve deeper into participation by the
parent in a treatment program and the number and quality of the parent's visits with the
children).
12. See infra notes 29-67 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 68-97 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 98-131 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 156-85 and accompanying text.
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Our title comes from Bob Dylan's masterpiece, It's Alright Ma (I'm
Only Bleeding).1 7 The lyric we use-"Temptation's page flies out the
door"-begins this remarkable verse:
Temptation's page flies out the door
You follow, find yourself at war
Watch waterfalls of pity roar
You feel to moan but unlike before
You discover that you'd just be one more
18
Person crying.
First, consider the "war" between those who support the "empowering
idea that people with disabilities can and should work once discriminatory
societal barriers are removed," 19 and those who "treat people with disabili-

ties through a medical model, seeking to objectively evaluate whether their
medical situation entitles them to governmental benefits. ' 20 Professor
Michael Waterstone has explicitly referred to this as a reflection of the
ways that "Federal laws and policies as they relate to the employment of
people with disabilities are at war with themselves. '2 1 Then, think about
how the complexity of the laws in this area-and the generally ineffective
level of counsel made available to persons with disabilities-causes any
reasonable on-looker to "moan." Finally, consider the "temptation" of allowing ourselves to fall into the trap of believing that the systems in question are somehow easy to maneuver. If we so succumb, we "[fly] out the
door," and our hopes of truly navigating these contradictory systems will
disappear.
I.

THE "LEGAL" SYSTEM

First, when we discuss the legal system in this paper, we are not talking about one legal system; rather, we are talking about many. The parable
about the group of blind men and the elephant-each blind man touches a
different part of the elephant's body and then incorrectly proclaims that the
17. Mr. Perlin has drawn on this song for a title before. See Michael L. Perlin,
Limited in Sex, They Dare: Attitudes Toward Issues of Patient Sexuality, 26 AMER.J.
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 25 (2005).
18. See Bob Dylan, It's Alright, Ma (I'm Only Bleeding), BOB DYLAN, <http://
www.bobdylan.com/songs/its-alright-ma-im-only-bleeding/> (last visited September
20, 2018).
19. Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Law, 85 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1081, 1081 (2010).
20. Id. at 1083.
21. Id. at 1081.
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entire elephant resembles his section 22-has been quoted in hundreds of law
23
review articles and cases, and likely comes to us from a Buddhist fable. It
has been quoted by, among others, former U.S. Vice President Al Gore,
while writing about environmental issues. 24 It has also been used to explain
the radically different views among the American public about the O.J.
Simpson trial. 25 However, we do not believe it has ever been invoked in a
discussion of what we are discussing here-how our views of "the legal
system" depend on which part of the legal system we are examining, an
especially important issue in the context of disability law. As we have
noted, there are at least five overarching areas that need to be considered:
the criminal law system, the civil rights law system, the international human
rights law system, the public benefits law system, and the private law system. Each system is complex, and each must be navigated carefully in matters involving litigants with disabilities.
In this paper, we will address only one aspect of one of these systems. 26 In the criminal law system, we will examine the question of criminal
competencies, a category that extends far beyond the typically focused on
question of fitness to proceed to trial. 27 Importantly, this is not a topic generally on the research or policy agenda of persons who characterize themselves as "disability rights activists. '28 The authors' decision to so limit
their focus should in no way suggest that the other systems (or the remainder of the criminal law system) are not important. We think these other
systems are vitally important and that the same points we seek to make
about this system will apply, in parallel ways, to those as well. Of course,
none of these systems stand alone. In many important ways, they are interconnected, and must be looked at in the context of the other systems.
We start with criminal law. Within this one "system," there are multiple systems to navigate in the context of criminal defendants who may have

22. See, e.g., David Zlotnick, The Buddha's Parable and Legal Rhetoric, 58
& LEE L. REv. 957, 958 (2001).

WASH.

23. See JoHN GODFREY SAXE, THE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN GODFREY SAXE,
THE BLIND MEN AND THE ELEPHANT: A HUNDoo FABLE 111 (1859).

24. Al Gore, Address at Rio Earth Summit, 59 TENN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1992).
25. See C. Keith Wingate, The O.J. Simpson Trial: Seeing the Elephant, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S

L. J. 121, 122 (1995).

26. The authors hope to address some of the others in subsequent papers.
27. See, e.g., PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, §§ 13-2 to 13-2.69, 13-.108 to 13151; Michael L. Perlin, Beyond Dusky and Godinez: Competency Before and After
Trial, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 297, 297-98 (2003).
28. Mr. Perlin draws on 45+ years of experience in coming to this conclusion.

2018-2019]

Therapeutic Jurisdiction

a psychosocial or intellectual disability. 29 These systems include: the system
of competency statuses, the system of criminal responsibility determinations, the system of sentencing (and the production of mitigating evidence),
and the system of determining whether an individual is a sexually violent
predator. Each of these raises discrete, complex, conceptual, strategic, and
ethical issues that must be "gotten" by practitioners and judges if adequate
representation is to be provided to the individual at risk.
Again, we limit ourselves here to questions of competency. The standard for competency to stand trial in the United States is, on paper, fairly
straight forward. The question to be asked is whether the defendant has
"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and whether he has a "rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him. ' 30 Does this standard
apply in the same way if the question is whether a defendant is competent
to represent himself? The U.S. Supreme Court said "yes" to this question in
1993,31 but backpedaled away from it in 2008.32 It still adheres to this stan33
dard in cases involving the competence of a defendant to plead guilty.
What about all the other areas of criminal competency: competency to consent to a search? To confess? To testify? To be sentenced? Or to file an
34
appeal ?
Judicial decisions in these latter areas appear to all be the classic "n of
1"; judges decide these cases without paying much attention to other similar
cases that have been decided in other jurisdictions, "surpris[ingly]" failing
"to consider carefully" other decisions in the same substantive sub-areas of

29. We use "mental disability" to subsume both these characterizations. Of
course, there are many defendants whose diagnoses overlap the two.
30. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960), as supplemented in Drope
v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1972). See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, ch.

13. Standards are not dissimilar in other common law jurisdictions. In Australia, by
way of example, it is "whether an accused has sufficient mental or intellectual capacity
to understand the proceedings and to make an adequate defense." Rex v. Pritchard, 173
Eng. Rep. 135, 304 (1836).
31. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 389 (1993). Mr. Perlin criticizes the Godinez
decision sharply in Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity Was the First to Leave": Godinez v.
Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14
BEHAV.

Sci. & L. 61, 65-70 (1996).

32. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008). See generally PEPLIN &
CUCOLO, supra note 1, § 13-2.4, 13-130 tol3-137.
33. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402.
34. For a discussion of multiple areas of the criminal law to which questions of
competency are relevant, see generally Perlin, supra note 27.
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competency law. 35 As Mr. Perlin and a colleague recently noted in an article
about criminology, scientific discoveries, and the judicial process, "the danger in failing to recognize the precedential value of decisions from other
jurisdictions is the creation of an inevitably divided legal system, in which a
person in one jurisdiction has the ability to introduce evidence that another
individual elsewhere could not." 36 A lawyer seeking to navigate this system
must understand these realities.
Importantly, in his dissent from the Supreme Court's decision that had
imposed a unitary standard for competency determinations, Supreme Court
Justice Harry Blackmun noted archly, "[a] person who is 'competent' to
play basketball is not thereby 'competent' to play the violin. . . . Competency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to competency for another purpose. '' 37 This prescient rejection of a "one size fits all" standardat least partially vindicated fifteen years later in the Edwards decision-is
38
another important piece of this puzzle that lawyers must understand.
It is imperative that lawyers understand and advocate for their clients'
needs, particularly for clients with mental disabilities. Lawyers are generally held to a standard of reasonable competence. 39 They have a duty to stay
abreast of changes in the law and are charged with being vigorous advocates for their clients. When representing a client with a mental disability or
dealing with an involuntary civil commitment hearing, a lawyer faces
heightened obligations in providing effective counsel. At a minimum, counsel should have a "competent understanding of the legal process of involuntary commitments, as well as the range of alternative, less restrictive
treatment and care options available. '40 Prior to an involuntary civil com35. Perlin, supra note 27, at 309-10. See also PERLIN & CucoLo, supra note 1,
§§ 13-2.5 to 13-2.7, 13-140 to 13-149.
36. Michael L. Perlin & Alison J.Lynch, "In the Wasteland of Your Mind": Criminology, Scientific Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CRuM. L. 304, 353
(2016).
37. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 413. See also id. ("The majority's monolithic approach
to competency is true to neither life nor the law.")
38. See generally Michael L. Perlin, et al., "Some Things are Too Hot to Touch":
Competency, the Right to Sexual Autonomy, and the Roles of Lawyers and Expert Witnesses, 35 TOURo L. REv. 405 (2019) (discussing the relationship between Godinez and
Edwards, and competency questions in the case of sexual autonomy decision making).
39. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 713-14 (1984). See also Perlin,
Fatal Assumption, supra note 5, at 53-54 (characterizing the "Strickland standard as
'sterile and perfunctory' where 'reasonably effective assistance' is objectively measured
by the 'prevailing professional norms"').
40. In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 498 (2001); but see Matter of J.S.,
401 P. 3d 197 (Mont. 2017) (partially overruling K.G.F.). See generally PERLIN &
CUCOLO, supra note 1, §§ 6-3.3.4, at 6-40 to 6-41 (discussing the relationship between
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mitment hearing or trial, counsel should fully investigate and comprehend
the client's circumstances. 41 This involves extensive work with the client to
understand the client's needs. 42 Counsel must wear two complementary
43
hats, acting as both an advocate and an adversary.
Finally, we are just beginning to understand the scope of a dilemma
that has been under the radar for far too long. 44 Merely raising the incompetency status is often a perilous decision. One of the most vexing ethical
issues that criminal attorneys face is whether to raise the issue of competency, and by extension, whether to raise the issue of competency over the
defendant's objection. 45 There are multiple reasons why an effective and
competent defense lawyer might not raise the question of incompetency,
among them being the subsequent lack of availability of bail, the conditions
of institutionalization at the referral hospital, and the possible iatrogenic or
46
ameliorative impact of psychiatric institutionalization on the defendant.
Josephine Ross has suggested that an "ethic of care" might call for disregarding incompetency concerns,47 and Christopher Slobogin and Amy
Mashburn underscore that the raise-or-not-raise decision is necessarily a
"nuanced" one. 48 In a particularly thoughtful piece, Keri Gould has described that the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel may ethically

K.G.F. and J.S.). Notwithstanding the decision in J.S., we believe that the standards laid
out in K.G.F. are the appropriate ones that should prevail.
41. K.G.F., 401 P. 3d at 492. On how this is regularly not done in civil commitment cases, see Perlin, Who Will Judge, supra note 9, at 939-45.
42. K.G.F., 401 P. 3d at 498.
43. Id. at 500.
44. See Michael L. Perlin, "Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail": Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate the Criminalizationof Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MIcH.
ST. U. J.L. & MED. 343, 360 (2013).
45. Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, "Said I, 'But You Have No
Choice' ": Why a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client's Decision about Mental
Health Treatment Even if It Is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUB.
L. POL'Y

&

ETHICS

J. 73, 103 (2016-2017).

46. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, § 13-1.5.4, 13-59 tol3-67 (discussing the
role of counsel in incompetency proceedings).
47. Josephine Ross, Autonomy Versus a Client's Best Interests: The Defense Lawyer's Dilemma When Mentally Ill Clients Seek to Control Their Defense, 35 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 1343, 1372-81, 1385 (1998) (discussing the relationship between therapeutic
jurisprudence and an "ethic of care").
48. Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Fiduciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1581, 1622
(2000).
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support the decision to ignore the competency question entirely. 49 This issue is of special importance in the case of defendants charged with petty
offenses who face little or no jail time if convicted, but may be institutionalized for years in maximum security facilities once the status issue is
50
raised.
The stakes are raised here because of the reality that, when the incompetency status is raised in a criminal case, "many lawyers also [often] impute a blanket incompetency in all aspects of life decision-making to such
clients. '5 1 Thus, the late Bruce Winick and his colleagues have suggested
that, in view of this reality and the negative psychological effects of incompetency labeling, criminal attorneys can help their clients interpret that legal
label in a way that "minimizes the risk of adverse psychological consequences. ' '52 This contrasts-totally-with the ways that lawyers must navigate the disability law system, in which they often must assert their client's
complete disability, 53 an assertion that, inevitably, often brings with it a
54
claim of incompetency.
Also, we need to consider the constellation of issues raised when the
state seeks to involuntarily medicate an incompetent defendant in order to
make him competent to stand trial,55 or when the state institutionalizes and
49. Keri A. Gould, A TherapeuticJurisprudenceAnalysis of Competency Evaluation Requests: The Defense Attorney's Dilemma, 18 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 83, 91-95

(1995).
50. See, e.g., Bruce Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA

L. Rev. 921, 941 (1985); Susan McMahon, Reforming Competency Restoration Stat-

utes, SSRN (Mar. 1, 2018), GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=3132700>.
51. Michael L. Perlin, "Too Stubborn to Ever Be Governed by Enforced Insanity": Some Therapeutic JurisprudenceDilemmas in the Representationof Criminal
Defendants in Incompetency and Insanity Cases, 33 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 475, 479

(2010).
52. Id. (citing, in part, BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED:
ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW 63-65 (1997), as quoted in Dennis Stolle et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence:A Law and Psychology Based
Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15, 37 (1997)). For dialogues that an
attorney might have with her client in such cases, see Perlin, supra note 51, at 480.
53. See Street v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 188 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (M.D. Fla.
2016), discussed in supra note 3 and accompanying text.
54. Patrick W. Corrigan et al., Structural Stigma in State Legislation, 56 PsyctiATRIC SERV. 557, 558 (2005) (discussing the difference between "mental illness" and
"incompetence" and how the two are often improperly equated, creating an environment that fosters discrimination and restricts rights).
55. See generally Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, "You Might Have
Drugs at Your Command": Reconsidering the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-
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forcibly medicates a person with a disability. Contrary to popular belief,
locking up and forcibly medicating people with mental disabilities is frequently not in their best interests, nor is it in the best interest of society as a
whole. 56 A strong argument can be made that, rather than protecting the
public, our current policies decrease safety, harming many psychiatric patients, both civil patients and those in the forensic system. 57 Rather than
encouraging persons with mental disabilities to seek meaningful treatment
and to promote inclusion into society, this method segregates people with
mental disabilities, and denies individuals their right to freedom and the
right to decline psychiatric treatment. 58 Further, this methodology ignores
the fact that many people with mental disabilities are capable of living in
society and of making informed decisions regarding their treatment and
59
therapy.
The Supreme Court has spoken on this issue in the specific context of
incompetency to stand trial proceedings, some fifteen years ago in Sell v.
United States,6° a case that has spawned a "cottage industry of commentary
on the question of whether the state can medicate an incompetent defendant
for the purpose of making him or her competent to stand trial."' 61 However,
we globally ignore the reality that Sell and its progeny apply only to poor
defendants-those who cannot make bail and thus are subject to the treat62
ment decisions made by their institutional keepers.
trial Detaineesfrom the Perspectives of InternationalHuman Rights and Income Inequality, 8 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 381, 385-86 (2015).

56. James B. Gottstein, Involuntary Commitment and Forced Psychiatric Drugging in the Trial Courts: Rights Violations as a Matter of Course, 25 ALASKA L. REv.
51, 51 (2008).
57. Id. By way of example, if the medication inhibits the defendant's capacity to
react to the proceedings and to demonstrate "remorse or compassion," the prejudice
suffered by the defendant can be especially acute at the sentencing stage. See Michael
L. Perlin, "Merchants and Thieves, Hungry for Power": ProsecutorialMisconduct and
Passive Judicial Complicity in Death Penalty Trials of Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 73 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 1501, 1532 (2016) [hereinafter Perlin, Merchants] (dis-

cussing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144
(1992)).
58. See, e.g., PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, §§ 8-7.2, at 8-159 to 8-165.
59. Mehgan Gallagher, No Means No, or Does It? A Comparative Study of the
Right to Refuse Treatment in a Psychiatric Institution, 44 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 137,
146-47 (2016).
60. Sell v. U.S. 539 U.S. 166 (2003). See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, §§ 87.3.2 to 8-7.3.2.2, 8-170 to 8-182.
61. Perlin & Schriver, supra note 55, at 382.
62. See id. at 383 ("What happens when a wealthy person, able to make bail on
any bailable crime, is in the community pending trial[?]").
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The circumstances under which persons with serious mental illnesses
find themselves in jail are dismal. Jail staff workers often have no education
or training in the appropriate treatment of detainees with a mental illness;
often, they respond aggressively, thus exacerbating the symptoms exhibited
by the detainees in question. 63 Many individuals with a mental illness are
disciplined or placed in solitary confinement rather than being afforded adequate treatment. 64 Additionally, persons with mental disabilities are often
forcibly medicated in jails and prisons. 65 However, even when treatment is
administered with good intentions, it often leaves a powerful, sometimes
lasting effect on the patient. For example, psychotropic medications are
known to affect the mind, intellectual functions, perception, moods, and
emotions. 66 In short, once the incompetent defendant is jailed pending trial,
a constellation of issues emerge that must be considered if we are to come
to grips with the inherent policy and behavioral contradictions (premised on
disability) that underpin this area of the law.
These issues raise the specter of what is called the "incredible dilemma": what can or should be done when multiple civil, constitutional, or
statutory rights and policies clash? 67 This dilemma highlights the underlying complexities of this aspect of one branch of the legal system. It is further exacerbated exponentially by the interplay (or, perhaps, lack of
interplay) between this strand of law and one aspect of the international
human rights law system, a relatively undiscussed, but extraordinarily im63. Id. at 396.
64. See, e.g., Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 325, 328-29 (2006); Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons:A Challengefor Medical Ethics,
38 J. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104, 104-05 (2010). See also Michael L. Perlin,
"God Said to Abraham/Kill Me a Son": Why the Insanity Defense and the Incompetency

Status Are Compatible with and Required by the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities and Basic Principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 54 AM. CRM. L.
REV. 479, 507-09 (2017).
65. See generally Henry A. Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, Legal Aspects of
Administering Antipsychotic Medications to Jail and Prison Inmates, 36 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 213 (2013) (discussing the legal standards regarding informed consent and
forcible administration of medication in correctional institutions).
66. V. G. LONGO, NEUROPHARMACOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR 182 (1972); Gerald L.
Klerman, Psychotropic Drugs as Therapeutic Agents, 2 HASTINGS CTR. STUD. 81, 82
n.1. (1974).
67. See Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier?,20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 517, 540 (1993-

94) (discussing Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional
Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IOWA L. REV. 741, 742 (1981)).
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portant topic.68 First, consider the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD). 69 There is no question that the CRPD is the most revolutionary international human rights document ever created that applies to
persons with disabilities.7 0 It furthers the human rights approach to disability-endorsing a social model and repudiating a purely medical modeland recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in nearly
every aspect of life.71 Although little attention has been paid to its potential
impact on forensic patients,7 2 it is essential that we focus on these questions
68. For an extensive discussion, see Perlin, supra note 64. See also Michael L.
Perlin & t va Szeli, Commentary on Article 14 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in COMMENTARY ON UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 402 (Ilias Bantekas, Dimitris Anastasiou & Michael Stein eds.,
2018) [hereinafter Perlin & Szeli, Commentary].
69. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 4.1(a), Dec. 13,
2006, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 [hereinafter CRPD].
70. See Michael L. Perlin, "A Change Is Gonna Come": The Implications of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilitiesfor the Domestic
Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 484
(2009); Michael L. Perlin & tva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution and Contemporary Challenges in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: VISION,
PRAXIS, AND COURAGE 80, 85 (Michael Dudley et al., eds. 2008) [hereinafter Perlin &
Szeli, Evolution]; Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human
Rights: Evolution, Challenges and the Promise of the New Convention, in UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:

MULTIDISC1PLI-

NARY PERSPECTIVES 241 (Jukka Kumpuvuori & Martin Scheninen, eds. 2010)
[hereinafter Perlin & Szeli, Challenges].
71. See, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting through the Lens of
Mental Disability: The Proposed InternationalConvention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 181,
191, 193, 196 (2005). On the tension between the two models, see Piers Gooding, Supported Decision-Making: A Rights-Based Disability Concept and Its Implications for
Mental Health Law, 20 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 431 (2013).
72. See Perlin, supra note 64, at 477 ("The conditions of treatment of forensic
patients - their institutionalization in psychiatric facilities, their confinement in such
facilities, and their possible pathways out - has always been stunningly under-considered."). Some attention has been paid, finally, in the last several years. See, e.g.,
Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, "You That Hide Behind Walls:" The Relationship Between the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the
Convention Against Torture and the Treatment of InstitutionalizedForensicPatients, in
TORTURE IN HEALTH-CARE SETTINGS: REFLECTIONS ON THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON
TORTURE'S 2013 THEMATIC REPORT 195, 216 (2013); Piers Gooding & Tova Bennet,

The Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Sweden and the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Human Rights Brinksmanship or Evidence It
Won't Work?, 21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 141, 150-52 (2018); Maya Sabatello, Where Have
the Rights of ForensicPatients Gone? 109 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 77, 78-79 (2015).
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notwithstanding the fact (or perhaps because of the fact) that so little consideration of the Convention's application to this population has yet ap73
peared in the literature.
The Convention firmly endorses a social model of disability and reconceptualizes mental health rights as disability rights-a clear and direct
repudiation of the medical model that traditionally was part-and-parcel of
mental disability law. 74 "The Convention. . .sketches the full range of
human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular application to the lives of persons with disabilities. ' 75 It provides a framework for
ensuring that mental health laws "fully recognize the rights of those with
mental illnesses," 76 and mandates prescriptive rights in addition to proscrip-

73. See generally Perlin & Schriver, supra note 55, at 385-86; Michael L. Perlin,
"Your Old Road Is! Rapidly Agin' ": InternationalHuman Rights Standards and Their
Impact on ForensicPsychologists, the Practice of Forensic Psychology, and the Conditions of Institutionalizationof Persons with Mental Disabilities, 17 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. 79 (2018). On how the CRPD has brought mental health issues more
forcefully into the field of human rights law than ever previously, see Perlin & Szeli,
Evolution, supra note 70.
74. Phil Fennell, Human Rights, Bioethics, and Mental Disorder, 27 MED. & L.
95, 106-07 (2008). See also Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 621, 649-59 (1999) (addressing the differences between the "social

model" and the "medical model"); Michael L. Perlin, "Abandoned Love": The Impact
of Wyatt v. Stickney on the Intersection Between InternationalHuman Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 121, 139 (2011). On how the
medical model "is in direct violation" of the CRPD, see Michael L. Perlin, Promoting
Social Change in Asia and the Pacific: The Need for a Disability Rights Tribunal to
Give Life to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 44 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 14 (2012). See also id. at 47 (discussing how a "human rights"

model of disability offers an even "more comprehensive framework for achieving social
justice"); Nancy J. Hirshmann, Disability Rights, Social Rights, and Freedom, 12 J.
INT'L POL. THEORY

42 (2016) (critiquing the social rights model for focusing on justice

rather than freedom). See generally PIERS

GOODING,

A NEW ERA FOR MENTAL HEALTH

POLICY: SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AND THE UN CONVENTION

ON THE RIGHTS OF

PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 47, 259-60 (2017) (discussing even "more comprehensive
framework for achieving social justice); Jonathan Mann, Health and Human Rights: If
Not Now, When? 2 HEALTH HUM. RTS. 113 (1997) (arguing the values and language of
human rights are better suited to addressing public health issues than a strict medical
model).
75. Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, Social Rights and the Relational Value
of the Rights to Participatein Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT'L L.J. 249, 256
(2009).
76. Bernadette McSherry, InternationalTrends in Mental Health Laws: Introduction, 26 LAW IN CONTEXT 1, 8 (2008).
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tive rights. 77 There is no question that it "has ushered in a new era of disa78
bility rights policy.
What is the relevance of this to the topic under discussion? Consider
Article 12 of the CRPD, which mandates "[e]qual recognition before the
law" 79 and requires that "States Parties shall take appropriate measures to
provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require
in exercising their legal capacity." 80 Next, consider Article 14, ensuring that
persons with disabilities "on an equal basis with others ... are not deprived
of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily, and that any deprivation of liberty
is in conformity with the law, and that the existence of a disability shall in
'81
no case justify a deprivation of liberty.
According to the General Comments (GCs) drafted by the U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, however, declarations of
unfitness to stand trial violate these articles,8 2 as such declarations, purportedly, "deprive [an individual] of his or her right to due process and safeguards that are applicable to every [other] defendant. '83 The Committee has
also criticized individual governments for maintaining procedures that permit a defendant to be deemed "unfit" to stand trial and subsequently detained.8 4 Suffice it to say, we disagree passionately: "[This] statement in the"

77. See GOODING, supra note 74, at 62 (explaining how the CRPD combines these
two categories of rights); Paul Harpur, Time to Be Heard: How Advocates Can Use the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilitiesto Drive Change, 45 VAL. U. L.
REv. 1271, 1295 (2011); Michael L. Perlin, The Significance of the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities- And Why It Demands the Creation of an Asian!•
Pacific Disability Rights Tribunal, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE KANAGAWA UNIvERSrrY
INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL STUDmS (2014) (manuscript at 9), available at <http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-_id=2512846&download=yes> (explaining the
significance of both proscriptive and prescriptive rights in the CRPD context in
specific).
78. Harpur, supra note 77, at 1295.
79. CRPD, supra note 69, art. 12.1.
80. Id. art. 12.3.
81. Id. art. 14(1)(b). See generally Perlin & Szeli, Commentary, supra note 68.
82. U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Statement on Article 14 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities(Sept. 2014), available at <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?-NewsID=15
183&LangID=E>.
83. Id.

84. See, e.g., U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding Observationson the Initial Report of New Zealand 33, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/NZL/
CO/I (2014).
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GCs... is the single most wrongheaded (and potentially destructive) state'85
ment uttered by any supporter of the CRPD since its initial drafting.
Nothing in this CRPD article offers the slightest shred of support to the
abolition of the incompetency status. First, international human rights have,
for decades, included the right to a fair trial. 86 The trial of a person who
cannot comprehend what is going on or who cannot cooperate with her
counsel cannot be a fair trial. Articulation of the incompetency status in no
way indicates factual guilt. 87 But if a defendant cannot articulate to her
lawyer what her defense is, what other witnesses might be able to shed light
on in relation to the underlying facts, or what her relationship with the alleged victim was, then it is incomprehensible to think that in all but the
rarest cases such a trial will lead to an acquittal.
Second, the Comment does not address the critical question of what
happens if such a person chooses to waive counsel and represent herself.
Such self-representation at trial will not "affirm the dignity" of a defendant
who lacks the mental capacity to conduct her defense without the assistance
of counsel.8 8 The trial of an incompetent defendant mocks any definition of
dignity; this is one of the basic tenets of the CRPD.
Third, even assuming there is any textual support within Article 14 for
this tortured reading, it is black-letter law that any piece of legislation must
be read in pari materia.8 9 It is axiomatic that a statute "must, to the extent
possible, ensure that the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent." 90
Consider again other articles of the CRPD: mandating "[r]espect for inherent dignity"; 91 "[fireedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treat85. Perlin, supra note 64, at 480.
86. See Charles Chernor Jalloh, Does Living by the Sword Mean Dying by the
Sword?, 117 PENN
87. AM. BAR

ST.

L. REv. 707, 740 (2013).

ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

ON MENTAL HEALTH

Ch. 7,

Pt. IV (2015).
88. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984)).
89. Statutes must be "taken, read, and construed together, each enactment in reference to the other, as though they were parts of one and the same law." Peraza v. State,
467 S.W.3d 508, 520 n.29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting Jones v. State, 396 S.W.3d
558, 561-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)).
90. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 222 (2008); see also Kevin Hembree, Of Two Minds about Plain Meaning: The Supreme Court's Interpretationof the
Word "Any" in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c), 60 MERCER L. REV. 1487, 1499 n.121 (2008)
("[A] statute should be both internally consistent and consistent with other similar statutes.") (citing LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID HRJCIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 172-73 (2006)).
91. CRPD, supra note 69, art. 3(a).
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ment or punishment"; 92 "[f]reedom

from exploitation,

violence and

abuse"; 93 a right to protection of the "integrity of the person"; 94 and the
retention of any provisions "more conducive to the ...rights of persons

with disabilities. '95 Any interpretation of Article 14 that makes it more
likely that factually innocent individuals will be convicted and incarcerated
and that makes it less likely that the individual's trial will be "fair" must be
rejected.
Beyond this, consider the "what if?" If the incompetency status were
to be abolished, then there is no question that the number of persons with
serious mental disabilities in prisons would increase dramatically. A recent
exhaustive report erases any shred of doubt that persons with mental disabilities are regularly brutalized and tortured in prison settings. 96 Consider
these findings by Human Rights Watch:
Corrections officials at times needlessly and punitively deluge them
with chemical sprays; shock them with electric stun devices; strap
them to chairs and beds for days on end; break their jaws, noses, ribs;
or leave them with lacerations, second degree bums, deep bruises,
and damaged internal organs. The violence can traumatize already
vulnerable men and women, aggravating their symptoms and making
future mental health treatment more difficult. In some cases, including several documented in this report, the use of force has caused or
97
contributed to prisoners' deaths.
In a recent article on restoration of competency practices, Professor
Susan McMahon focuses on the status of such individuals in jail settings:,:
"Unable to follow the strict rules and regulations of a jail environment, they
are punished by corrections officials and targeted by fellow in92. Id. art. 15.
93. Id. art. 16.
94. Id. art. 17.
95. Id.art. 4(4). See also John Dawson, A Realistic Approach to Assessing Mental
Health Laws' Compliance with the UNCRPD, 40 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 70, 71
(2015) (arguing that failure to consider a person's disability may, under some circumstances, be discriminatory).
96. See generally E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of
Sentencing and Mental Illness, 103 J. Crm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147 (2013)
("[O]ffenders with serious mental illnesses are more likely than non-ill offenders to
suffer physical and sexual assaults ....); E. Lea Johnston, Conditions of Confinement
at Sentencing: The Case of Seriously DisorderedOffenders, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 625
(2014).
97. HUMAN RIGHrrs WATCH, CALLOUS AND CRUEL (2015), available at <https://
www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/12/callous-and-cruel/use-force-against-inmates-mentaldisabilities-us-jails-and>.
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mates... [T]hey are relegated to solitary confinement and subject to abuse
'98
and neglect in far greater numbers than non-mentally-ill detainees.
In short, when seeking to navigate the criminal justice system in the
context of the variables on which we focus in this article, this navigation
must be done with an eye toward the international human rights system to
avoid the peril in which the position taken by some in the disability rights
community would place the population in question.
II.

THE DISABILITY SYSTEM

Consider now the questions that relate to navigation of the disability
system. As already noted, there are also multiple disability "systems." Here,
we focus on the incompatibility of the disability law "system" that flows
from international human rights, and the one that flows from social benefits
law. In many ways, these two systems are in direct opposition to each
other, and it is essential that we see the contradictions if we are to better
understand the "bigger picture." 99
International human rights law repudiates the medical model that has
driven the disability system for centuries. 100 For example, the CRPD flatly
rejects this view of the relationship between persons with disability and
society.' 0 ' It "responds to traditional models, situates disability within a so-

cial model framework, and sketches the full range of human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular application to the lives of
persons with disabilities."'' 02 It provides a framework for ensuring that
98. McMahon, supra note 50, at 13.
99. Beyond the scope of this.article is an extended consideration of how we react
to different sorts of disabilities. We note here only that the valid and reliable research is
clear: people with mental disabilities-historically, among the most excluded members
of society, are subject to greater prejudice than are people with physical disabilities.
SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL

Act 4-5 (2001); see Michael E.
Waterstone & Michael Ashley Stein, Disabling Prejudice, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1351,
1363-64 (2008).
100. See Perlin & Schriver, supra note 55, at 385.
101. Dhir, supra note 71, at 191. See generally Thomas F. Burke & Jeb Barnes,
DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES

Layering, Kludgeocracy and Disability Rights: The Limited Influence of the Social
Model in American Disability Policy, 17 SOC'L POL'Y & Soc'Y 101 (2018).

102. Lord & Stein, supra note 75, at 256. On how the CRPD fits within a social
framework, see H. Archibald Kaiser, CanadianMental Health Law: The Slow Process
of Redirecting the Ship of State, 17 HEALTH L.J. 139, 164 (2009); Janet E. Lord, David
Suozzi & Allyn L. Taylor, Lessons From the Experience of U.N. Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Global

Health Governance, 38 J.L.

MED.

& ETHICS 564, 568 (2010); Ronald McCallum, The
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mental health laws "fully recognize the rights of those with mental illness." 10 3 There is no question that it has changed the conversation surrounding disability rights policy 4
This repudiation of the medical model demonstrates, in Professor Gerard Quinn's eloquent phrase, the way that the CRPD provides a "moral
compass for change," reflecting a "paradigm shift" in the way that we think
about and treat persons with disabilities." 105 There is no disputing Professor
Penelope Weller's conclusion that it illustrates "profound shifts both in the
conception of human rights and the implementation of human rights in public policy domains."

10 6

Contrarily, if one is, say, seeking government benefits because their
disability interferes with their ability to gain paid employment, such a person must rely on the medical model to offer proof that they are unableeither for physical or mental reasons-to work. This model "casts people

United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Some Reflections (Sydney Law Sch. Research Paper No. 10/30, 2010), <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1563883>.
103. McSherry, supra note 76, at 8.
104. Harpur, supra note 77, at 1295. On how international human rights courts
and commissions have begun to use international human rights standards in cases
brought on behalf of institutionalized persons with mental disabilities, see Michael L.
Perlin, An Internet-based Mental Disability Law Program: Implications for Social
Change in Nations with Developing Economies, 40 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 435, 447-48
(2007) (discussing Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 12/97, OEA/Ser.L./VII.95, doc. 7 (1997)); Perlin, supra note 70, at 137 (discussing
Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, Comm. No. 241/2001, in 11 INT'L HUM. RIGHTS
REP. 257 (Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights 2003)). On considering how
different regional courts have enforced the CRPD in general, see THE UN CONVENTION
ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES IN PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE ANALY-

(Lisa Waddington & Anna Lawson, eds. 2018); Jonathan
Bindman et al., The Human Rights Act and Mental Health Legislation, 182 BRrr. J.
PSYCHIATRY 91 (2003); Lance Gable et al., Mental Health and Due Process in the
Americas: Protecting the Rights of Persons Involuntarily Admitted to and Detained in
.PsychiatricInstitutions, 18 PAN. AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 366 (2005); Alison A. Hillman,
Human Rights and Deinstitutionalization:A Success Story in the Americas, 18 PAN.
AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 374 (2005).
SIS OF TH-E ROLE OF COURTS

105. Gerard Quinn, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities: Toward a New InternationalPoliticsof Disability, 15 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R.
33, 34, 41 (2009). See also id. at 52 (characterizing the CRPD as a "beacon for an
international consensus on justice and disability").
106. Penelope Weller, Human Rights and Social Justice: The Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Quiet Revolution in International Law, 4
PUB. SPACE: J. L. & Soc. JUST. 74, 90 (2009).
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with disabilities as the passive recipients of public welfare or charity.' 0 7
Indeed, many U.S. public assistance and health insurance programs have
been criticized for creating incentives for people to not return to work. 10 8
There is no disputing Professor Matthew Diller's conclusion that such social welfare policies "reflect a series of uneasy compromises between competing principles."' 1 9 As Professor Ani Satz has noted, "The Social Security
Act fragments the disability experience in another significant way. Individuals with disabilities must often choose between employment (and civil
rights protections in employment) and social support."' 110
Another important international document relevant to the human rights
of persons with trauma-related disabilities is the WHO International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). 111 The ICF-the
"WHO framework for measuring health and disability at both individual
and population levels"-was officially endorsed "as the international standard to describe and measure health and disability" by all the 191 WHO
Member States at the Fifty-Fourth World Health Assembly in May 2001.112
The ICF acknowledges that every individual is capable of experiencing
at least some degree of disability throughout their lifetime, whether it be
through a change in health or environment, 113 and that "disability is a universal human experience, sometimes permanent, sometimes transient" and
is not restricted to a small portion of the population."l 4 Again, this international human rights approach is radically different from the systems in place
in many domestic jurisdictions.
It is necessary for one of the authors (Mr. Perlin) to personalize this
analysis and share how he has dealt with this issue in the days that he was a
107. Waterstone, supra note 19, at 1087.
108. Id. at 1089 (citing, inter alia, Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability
Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (2004)).
109. Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REv. 361, 361 (1996). The ways in which laws such
as the Americans with Disabilities Act have been conceived of as "welfare reform"
rather than as civil rights are critiqued in Hirschmann, supra note 74.
110. Ani B. Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation in Disability and Health Law, 60
EMORY L.J. 277, 298 (2010).

111. We consider the significance of the ICF in Mehgan Gallagher & Michael L.
Perlin, "The Pain I Rise Above": How InternationalHuman Rights Can Best Realize
the Needs of Persons with Trauma-Related Mental Disabilities,29 FLA. J. INT'L L 271,

288-89 (2018).
112.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF FUNC-

(ICF), available at <http://www.-who.int/classifications/icf/en/> (visited April 24, 2018).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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legal practitioner in two very different ways. First, when Mr. Perlin was in
practice in his position as director of the Division of Mental Health Advocacy in the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate,' 1 5 he litigated a
class action/law reform suit, Schindenwolf v. Klein,"16 arguing that, if patients at state psychiatric hospitals were to do work for which the state received a consequential economic benefit, they needed to be paid in
conformity with the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act and prevailing case
law." 7 This was hotly contested by state defendants, but Mr. Perlin wound
up prevailing. The Court signed an order, concluding that, "The resumption,
continuation and strengthening of voluntary, compensated work programs
and participation in vocational rehabilitation services may enhance residents' sense of self-motivation, self-esteem and usefulness, may diminish
boredom and lessen states of dependency and withdrawal, and may protect
against exploitation and allow residents to view themselves as worthwhile."" 8 The Court ordered that the state defendant, the Department of
Human Services, was to involve no less than 25 percent of all state hospital
residents in employment and vocational rehabilitation services. 1 9
Some years later, when he became a professor, Mr. Perlin directed the
Federal Litigation Clinic at New York Law School. 120 In this role, he supervised students who represented persons with physical and mental disabilities on appeals from decisions by federal Administrative Law Judges in the
Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, who had rejected their appli115. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Mental PatientAdvocacy by a PatientAdvocate,
54 PSYCHIATRIC

Q.

169, 169 (1982).

116. Schindenwolf v. Klein, No. L41293-75 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1975), reprinted in PIrLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, at § 19-5 (granting patients the
right to participate in voluntary, therapeutic, compensated work programs as an aspect
of the right to treatment).
117. See Michael L. Perlin, The Right to Participate in Voluntary, Therapeutic,
Compensated Work Programs as Partof the Right to Treatment: A New Theory in the
Aftermath of Souder, 7 SETON HALL L. REv. 298, 298-99 (1976). In Souder v. Brennan,
the court had held that patient-workers at public psychiatric hospitals were "employees"
within coverage of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, notwithstanding the claim that
the work in question was therapeutic. See Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808, 811-15
(D.D.C. 1973).
118. PERmiN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, § 19-5, at 19-31.
119. Id. at 19-32. Of note: Mr. Perlin was accused by some other patients' rights
lawyers of "supporting slavery" for representing his clients in this case. Mr. Perlin responded that he was representing the views of his (presumptively competent) clients,
which is what any ethical lawyer must do. See Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 45, at 9499.
120. See Michael L. Perlin, Stepping Outside the Box: Viewing Your Client in a
Whole New Light, 37 CAL.

WEST.

L. REv. 65, 67 (2000).
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cations for SSI and SSDI benefits. To adequately represent their clients, the
student attorneys needed to demonstrate that their clients were sufficiently
disabled so as to qualify for benefits.' 2' To do so, they sought to amass
expert evidence that would attest to the extent of their disability. In other
words, to satisfy federal administrative and statutory law, they needed to
22
show that their clients were fully medically disabled.
This predated both the CRPD and the Principles for the Protection of
Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care
of 1991 (MI Principles), the forerunner "soft law" document of the United
Nations, 123 and truthfully, no one thought of international human rights law
at this time' 24 in this context. 125 Indeed, it would have been impossible for
121. See Arne

H. Eide et al., Participation,in HEALTH

PROFESSIONAL CONCEPTS AND LIVED EXPERIENCE

AND WELFARE SERVICES:
146 (2017) ("the medical provider

holds the key to eligibility for disability benefits").
122. For representative cases, see Hill v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Tirado v. Bowen, 705 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Baran v. Bowen, 710 F.
Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Rodriguez v. Heckler, 621 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
See also Samuel Bagenstos, Disability, Universalism,Social Rights, and Citizenship, 39
CARDOZO L. REV. 413, 430 (2017) (explaining that "disability rights advocates cannot
abandon disability-based benefits"); Burke & Barnes, supra note 101, at 101 (noting
that such benefits programs "reflect a medical model of disability that is at odds with
the social model").
123. Principlesfor the Protectionof Personswith Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 119, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49
Annex, at 188-92, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991).

124. Mr. Perlin directed this Clinic from 1984-90. The first literature on this topic
did not appear in the law review literature until 1993. See generally Eric Rosenthal &
Leonard Rubenstein, InternationalHuman Rights Advocacy Under the "Principlesfor
the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness," 16 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 257
(1993).
125. The MIl Principles have subsequently been criticized as not being sufficiently
protective of the rights of persons with psychosocial disabilities, especially in the context of the right to refuse treatment. See Tina Minkowitz, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Right to be Free from
Nonconsensual Psychiatric Interventions, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 405, 407
(2007); T.W. Harding, Human Rights Law in the Field of Mental Health: A Critical
Review, 101 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 24, 24 (2000) (calling them "basically
flawed"). Nevertheless, there is no question that -prior to the ratification of the CRPD
- they became the "centerpiece of the human rights based approach to mental health
care" in common law nations such as Australia. See Neil Rees, InternationalHuman
Rights Obligations and Mental Health Tribunals, 10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 33
(2003); see also Terry Carney, Mental Health in Postmodern Society: Time for New
Paradigms? 10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 12 (2003); Michael L. Perlin & Naomi
Weinstein, "There's Voices in the Night Trying to be Heard": The PotentialImpact of
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them to have provided adequate representation to their clients had they not,
126
for these purposes, "bought into" the medical model.
But we believe it is impossible for lawyers to provide adequate and
effective representation to persons with disabilities without embracing the
social model. Since, to the best of our knowledge, there has been almost no
consideration of the impact of the social model on benefits law, it is necessary that practitioners and scholars start taking seriously the way these systems conflict. One example of this conflict is the "tension between the
obligation to work and the desire to aid those in need."' 127 According to
Professor Diller:
History demonstrates that programs that seek to cast a broad net by
relying on inclusive definitions of disability aid more individuals but
are less likely to provide a package of benefits that is markedly superior to those offered to the poor generally. On the other hand, programs that emphasize exclusion by relying on narrow definitions of
disability aid fewer people but are more likely to provide benefits on
dignified and non-punitive terms. This dynamic does not stem simply from the economic equation that, absent lower benefits, broader
programs are costlier. Rather, inclusive definitions of disability highlight the fact that disability is not easily separable from other putative
"causes" of chronic unemployment. Narrow definitions obscure this
difficulty by presenting disability128as a status that is medically given,
rather than socially constructed.
The medical model of disability looks at disability as a "problem" that
belongs to the disabled individual, forcing the individual to make accommodations in order to adapt to the environment. 129 The medical model.
views disability as something that needs to be corrected. 130 Alternatively,
the social model (the view to which the authors adhere) looks at disability
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilitieson Domestic Mental Disability Law," BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
126. On how the medical model itself contributes to the disabling of individuals,

see Emma Gieben-Gamal & S6nia Matos, Design and Disability.Developing New OpDESIGN J. § 2022 (Supp. 1, 2017).
127. Diller, supra note 109, at 363-64.

portunities for the Design Curriculum, 20

128. Id.
129. Sara Goering, Rethinking Disability: The Social Model of Disability and
ChronicDisease, 8 CURR. REV. MUSCULOSKELETAL MED. 134, 134 (2015) (citing Anita
Silvers, A Fatal Attraction to Normalizing, in ENHANCING HUMAN TRAITS 95 (Erik
Pares ed., 1998)).
130. Pamela Fisher & Dan Goodley, The Linear Medical Model of Disability:
Mothers of Disabled Babies Resist with Counter-Narratives,29 SOCIOLOGY HEALTH &
ILLNESS

66, 66 (2007).
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as something affecting society as a whole, and puts the burden on societyrather than the individual-to adapt.' 3' The medical model sounds in pathology;13 2 it views a person in a wheelchair as the problem, while the social
model views the stairs obstructing wheelchair access to a building as the
133
problem that society is responsible for fixing.
It is imperative that lawyers take a holistic approach to representing all
clients-but particularly those with mental disabilities. Counsel must recognize that there is no "one size fits all" approach to disability; thus, each
client should be treated on an individual basis, identifying their needs,
wants, and circumstances to provide effective representation that is in line
with the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence and human rights discussed
34
throughout this article.1
JIl.

COMPETENCY OF COUNSEL

This leads us to re-direct our inquiry to focus on what lawyers do, and
what they should do, in navigating these complex systems. When we undertake this investigation, several realities jump out at us:
131. Arlene Kanter, The Law: What's Disability Studies Got to Do with It, or An
Introduction to Disability Law Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 420-21
(2011); see also Arlene Kanter & Yotam Tolub, The Fightfor Personhood, Legal Capacity, and Equal Recognition under Law for People with Disabilities in Israel and

Beyond, 39 CARDOZO L. REv. 557, 559 (2017) ("[The CRPD] changes the focus of
legal capacity decisions from a medical model of disability, that addresses the deficit of
the individual and emphasizes protection, to a social model of disability, that honors the
dignity of the individual and his or her right to exercise legal capacity on an equal basis
with others, and with support, if needed.").
132. See Piers Gooding et al., Unfitness to Stand Trial and the Indefinite Detention of Persons with Cognitive Disabilitiesin Australia: Human Rights Challenges and
Proposalsfor Change, 40 MELB. U. L. REV. 816, 830 (2017); see also Megan Brooks,
How the World's Best Education Systems Fall Short: Implementing Inclusive Education
under the CRPD in High Performing PISA Countries, 45 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. &

COM. 1, 4 (2017) ("The medical model of disability views an individual's disability
diagnosis and uses a treatment method to 'fix' the person and push them to conform to
society's norms.").
133. UNIv. OF LEICESTER, THn SOCIAL AND MEDICAL MODEL OF DISABILITY,

available at <https://www2.1e.ac.uk/offices/accessability/staff/accessabilitytutors/information-for-accessability-tutors/the-social-and-medical-model-of-disability>
(visited
Apr. 22, 2018).
134. See generally Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 45. Examples of a lawyer using

the social model to represent a client include using larger fonts in preparing documents
for a client with a visual impairment or making an easy to read pamphlet explaining a
law or motion for a client with an intellectual disability.
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1) Counsel assigned to persons with disabilities has historically been
135
inadequate, in both civil and criminal cases.
2) In some jurisdictions, there is no counsel available at all for this
36
population. 1
3) It is essential that there be a "wake up" call for lawyers so that it
will be more likely that authentic representation be provided, something that can best be done through dedicated offices of welltrained trained stand-alone lawyers.
4) We must confront the pervasive stench of sanism that totally contaminates the entire legal process in cases involving persons with
disabilities.
We cannot overestimate the impact of these realities on all the questions we have raised here.
First, there is no question as to the inadequacy of counsel assigned to
represent persons with disabilities in most jurisdictions.1 37 Nearly a decade
ago, Mr. Perlin concluded "if there has been any constant in modern mental
disability law in its thirty-five-year history, it is the near-universal reality
that counsel assigned to represent individuals at involuntary civil commitment cases is likely to be ineffective." 138 Over twenty years ago, Mr. Perlin
pointed out that a Presidential Commission on Mental Health noted the frequently substandard level of representation made available to mentally disabled criminal defendants, adding, "Nothing that has happened in the past
two decades has been a palliative for this problem."' 39 In many jurisdic-'
tions, such counsel is "woefully inadequate-disinterested, uninformed,
135. For a recent analysis of the abject lack of adequacy of counsel in death penalty cases involving defendants with mental disabilities, see Perlin et al., supra note 10.
136. Many are startled to learn that in some U.S. jurisdictions, there is no absolute
right to counsel in cases that may result in "sexually violent predators" being incarcerated in prison-like maximum security facilities for life. See, e.g., Cucolo & Perlin, Turbulent Space, supra note 5, at 132 (citing, inter alia, Ramsey v. Runion, No. 2:1 lcv396,
2012 WL 3883378, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept. 5, 2012) (stating "there is no federally cognizable right to effective assistance of counsel in a civil commitment proceeding")).
137. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promises of Paradise":Will Olmstead v.
L.C. Resuscitate the Constitutional Least Restrictive Alternative Principle in Mental
Disability Law? 37 HOUSTON L. Ruv. 999 (2000); Perlin & Dorfman, Wastin' Time,
supra note 5, at 117.
138. Perlin, Your Funeral, supra note 5, at 241. This, of course, presumes that
counsel is available to represent these individuals. See, e.g., Lynch & Perlin, supra note
5, at 355-57. Professor Heather Campbell has reminded us that in Canada, such representation is not mandatory in all provinces. Personal communication from Professor
Heather Campbell to author (Oct. 15, 2016) (on file with author).
139. Perlin, Executioner's Face, supra note 5, at 207-08.
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roleless, and often hostile."' 40 This is nothing new; we knew this at the
142
dawn of the modem era of mental health law, 14' and we know it today.
Second, perilously few jurisdictions have chosen to follow the examples of New York, New Jersey, and a handful of other American states that
legislatively created regularized, dedicated, and specialized legal services
offices whose primary job is to provide representation to persons with
mental disabilities at involuntary civil commitment hearings. 4 3 Even today,
in the highly-charged area of sexual predator civil commitment law,' 4
many states in the U.S. make no provision for counsel, basing their inaction
on the (false) premise that these are civil and not criminal cases. 45 The
right to counsel at each stage in the commitment process is not automatically granted and has been denied during pre-commitment evaluations, as
well as during the psychological evaluation for the annual review hearing. 146 We were stunned to read in Australian legal aid lawyer Eleanore
Fritze's recent brilliant monograph that only a minority of Australian citizens are granted a right to counsel when they appear before the Mental
Health Review Tribunal in that nation.1 47 This is utterly unacceptable. 48
140.
141.
142.
"paralytic

Perlin, Best Friend, supra note 5, at 738.
Perlin, Your Funeral, supra note 5, at 241.
Perlin & Lynch, Mr. Bad Example, supra note 9, at 299-300 (discussing
rolelessness" of counsel); see generally Perlin, supra note 9.
143. Perlin, Your Funeral,supra note 5, at 242; see generally PERLIN & CUCOLO,
supra note 1, §§ 6-4.2, at 6-41 to 6-48.
144. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.

145. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351 (1997). Mr. Perlin has
MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, SHAMING

critiqued this decision. See

THE CONSTITUTION: THE DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR LEGISLATION

(2017); see generally Michael L. Perlin, "There's No Success like Failure/and

Failure's No Success at All": Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92

Nw. U. L. REV. 1247 (1998).
146. Cucolo & Perlin, Promoting Dignity, supra note 5, at 303; Greenfield v. N.J.
Dep't of Corr., 888 A.2d 507, 511 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (holding that a sex
offender had no due process right to review materials or meet with a committee addressing his possible referral to the state's attorney general for commitment as a sexually violent predator).
147.

ELEANORE FRITZE, SHINING A LIGHT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: REPORT OF THE

JACK BROCKHOFF

FOUNDATION

CHURCHILL

FELLOWSHIP

TO

BETTER

PROTECT

THE

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, DETAINED IN CLOSED ENVIRONMENTS

FOR COMPULSORY TREATMENT,

THROUGH THE USE OF LEGAL SERVICES

31-32 (2015).
148. Fleur Beaupert & Eleanore Fritze, Ensuring Meaningful Participation in Fair
Mental Health Tribunal Hearings: The Critical Role of Legal Representatives (paper
presented at the Second International Conference on Non-Adversarial Justice, spon-
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Third, we must acknowledge that, without a cadre of trained, dedicated, advocacy-focused counsel, it is impossible to aspire to any meaningful level of ameliorative change in this area. Only the appointment and
continued presence of such lawyers can make it possible for meaningful law
reform in all aspects of commitment and institutional rights law to take
place. 149 Without the assignment of such counsel, meaningful and amelio150
rative change is almost impossible to achieve.
Fourth, it is impossible to understand why this happens the way it does
without understanding the significance of what we call "sanism." We believe it is impossible to understand anything we are discussing today without an understanding of this invidious "ism." Sanism infects both our
jurisprudence and our lawyering practices; it is largely invisible and largely
socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and reflects the assumptions that are made
by the legal system about persons with mental disabilities-who they are,
how they got that way, what makes them different, what there is about them
that lets society treat them differently, and whether their condition is immutable. These assumptions-those that reflect societal fears and apprehensions about mental disability, persons with mental disabilities, and the
possibility that any individual may become mentally disabled-ignore the
most important question of all: why do we feel the way we do about "these
people" (quotation marks understood)? 151 We can make no headway whatsoever in understanding why the navigation of the systems we have dis1 52
cussed is so difficult unless we come to grips with sanism.
sored by the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (Sydney, SW, Australia,
April 8, 2017)).
149. Perlin, supra note 70, at 496. See generally Perlin, Your Funeral,supra note
3.
150. Michael L. Perlin, Online Distance Legal Education as an Agent of Social
Change, 24 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. L.J.

95, 104 (2011).

151. See Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting
Rain": Consideringthe Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons InstitutionalizedBecause of
Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitalsand in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 486 (2008)

[hereinafter Perlin, Expecting Rain]; Michael L. Perlin, "My Sense of Humanity Has
Gone Down the Drain": Stereotypes, Stigma and Sanism, in STEREOTYPING AS

A

HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 95 (Alexandra Timmer & Eva Brems eds. 2015); Michael L.

Perlin, On Sanism, 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 373-77 (1992); Perlin & Lynch, "Mr. Bad
Example," supra note 9; Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 125. See generally Michael L.
Perlin, "Infinity Goes up on Trial": Sanism, Pretextuality, and the Representation of
Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 16 QUT L. REV. 106 (2016).

152. See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 9, at 300 (sanism "makes negative case out.comes nearly inevitable").
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Failure on the part of counsel to embrace representation of this population is, we believe, a direct outgrowth of sanism. 153 Nearly three decades
ago, one of the leading civil rights lawyers in this area of the law noted,
regretfully, how "few have been willing to enter the courtroom on behalf of
persons labeled as mentally ill or mentally retarded or to speak to a jury
about the injuries imposed on these vulnerable citizens." 154 This lack of
counsel, he added, contributed to "their continued legal invisibility." 155 It is
156
little wonder, then, that these systems remain so hard to navigate.

IV.

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE

15 7

One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past
three decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ).1 58 Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a
153. See Elayne Greenberg, Overcoming Our Global Disability in the Workforce:
Mediating the Dream, 86 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 579, 593 (2012) ("The dynamics of sanism and pretextuality are a toxic combination that potentially weakens any enforcement
opportunities of the CRPD."). "Pretextuality" means that courts regularly accept (either
implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty, countenance liberty deprivations in disingenuous ways that bear little or no relationship to case law or to statutes and engage
similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision making, specifically where
witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort
their testimony in order to achieve desired ends." PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, § 23 at 2-10 (citing, in part, Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and
Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense, " Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance,
19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991)).
154. Steven J. Schwartz, Damage Actions as a Strategy for Enhancing the Quality
of Care Of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 651,

661 (1989-90).
155. Id. at 663.
156. On how our disability benefits system stigmatizes persons with disabilities,
see Samuel Bagenstos, Disability, Universalism, Social Rights, and Citizenship, 39
CARDOZO

L.

REV.

413, 435 (2017).

157. This section is generally adapted from Michael L. Perlin & Alison J.Lynch,
"All His Sexless Patients": Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to
Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257 (2014); Perlin & Lynch, supra note 36; Perlin &
Weinstein, supra note 45. Further, it distills Mr Perlin's work over the past 25-plus

years, beginning with Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence? 10
N.Y.L. ScH. J.HUM. RTS. 623 (1993).
158. See, e.g., BRUCE J. WNICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A
DENCE MODEL (2005); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK,

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRU-

KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE

(1996);

LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC
DAVID B. WEX-

(1990). Wexler first used the term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health

LER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT
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therapeutic

agent, the

consequences.

law

can have therapeutic

or anti-therapeutic

59

1

TJ asks whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should
be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating
due process principles. 60 David Wexler clearly identifies how the inherent
tension in this inquiry must be resolved: "the law's use of mental health

information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice concerns." 16 1 As Mr. Perlin has written elsewhere, "An inquiry into
therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil
162
rights and civil liberties."
Using TJ, we "look at law as it actually impacts people's lives" 163 and
64
assess law's influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.'
One governing TJ principle is that "law should value psychological health,
should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever
possible, and when consistent with other values served by law should at-

in 1987. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 32-33 (1992).
159. See Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill":
How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42
AKRON

L. REV. 885, 912 (2009); see also Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental

Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH
LAW 91 (Ian Freckelton & Kate Peterson eds. 2006) (writing from a transnational
perspective).
160. Perlin, Expecting Rain, supra note 151, at 510 n.139; Perlin, Best Friend,
supra note 5, at 751. See also Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic JurisprudenceMisunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
575, 585-86 (2008).
161. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Changing Concepts of Le-

gal Scholarship, 11

BEHAV.

Sci. & L. 17, 21 (1993). See also David B. Wexler, Apply-

ing the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPL. & PREVENT. PSYCHOL. 179 (1996).
162. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 407, 412 (2000);
Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline": Mental Disability
Law, Theory and Practice, Us and Them, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998).
163. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on
Dealing with Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
164. David B. Wexler, PracticingTherapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft
Spots and Strategies, in DANIEL P. STOLLE ET AL., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION

45 (2006).
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tempt to bring about healing and wellness."1 65 TJ supports an ethic of
care. 166
Professor Amy Ronner has argued persuasively that one of the essential values of therapeutic jurisprudence is adherence to what she characterizes as the "three Vs": voice, validation, and voluntariness. 167 Professor
Ronner concludes:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a
sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If
that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard,
and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of
validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a
sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the
1 68
outcome.
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity, 69 a
value that must permeate the justice system. With his colleagues Keri
Gould and Deborah Dorfman, Mr. Perlin has concluded that "[tihe perception of receiving a fair hearing is therapeutic because it contributes to the
individual's sense of dignity and conveys that he or she is being taken seriously. ' 170 In a recent article about dignity and the civil commitment process, Professors Jonathan Simon and Stephen Rosenbaum embrace
therapeutic jurisprudence as a modality of analysis, and focus specifically
on this issue of voice. "When procedures give people an opportunity to
exercise voice, their words are given respect, decisions are explained to
them their views taken into account, and they substantively feel less coer-

165. Bruce Winick, A TherapeuticJurisprudenceModel for Civil Commitment, in
INVOLUNTARY

DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PER-

SPECrIVE ON CiVL CoMmrTMENT

23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, eds. 2003).

166. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of TherapeuticJurisprudence in Law School ClinicalEducation: Transforming the CriminalLaw Clinic, 13
CLINICAL

L. REV. 605, 605-07 (2006).

167. Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education
and Therapeutic Jurisprudenceas Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REv.

601, 627 (2008).
168. Id.
169. See BRUCE J.
MODEL 161 (2005).

WNICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT:

A

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE

170. Michael L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould & Deborah A. Dorfman, TherapeuticJurisprudence and the Civil Rights of InstitutionalizedMentally DisabledPersons: Hopeless
Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 80, 114 (1995) (emphasis added).
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cion."171 With his colleague Naomi Weinstein, Mr. Perlin has recently argued that "attorneys must embrace the principles and tenets of therapeutic
jurisprudence as a means of best ensuring the dignity of their clients and of
172
will be
maximizing the likelihood that voice, validation and voluntariness
173
enhanced."
Professor Ronner and Judge Juan Ramirez recognize the right to effective counsel as "the core of therapeutic jurisprudence." 1 74 The attorney is an
essential part of the legal context, especially in a criminal proceeding. She
assists individuals in articulating their wishes and telling their stories, aids
in effectuating individuals' participatory interests, giving them voice and
validation. 175 The question to be posed here is whether the complex systems
we discuss in this paper-the systems of law and disability-can ever be
meaningfully and effectively navigated if these principles of therapeutic jurisprudence are ignored. We believe the answer is simply "no."
First, if we look at "the law" as a unitary construct, we ignore the
significant differences between the various areas of law that must be analyzed separately. Criminal law, by way of example, involves the state as a
party in all proceedings, sees punishment of offenders as one of its goals,
and-in the U.S., at least-is limited by a series of constitutional decisions
involving such issues as the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to
confront witnesses, and a burden of proof of "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that are absent from most areas of civil law. We believe that the need to
adhere to Professor Ronner's "three Vs" is enhanced in the criminal justice
171. Jonathan Simon & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Dignifying Madness: Rethinking
Commitment Law in an Age of Mass Incarceration,70 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 51 (2015).
172. See Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence,Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 89, 94-95
(2002). Ironically, and importantly, a "voluntary" status in mental health commitment is
not always truly voluntary. On the ways that hospital staff can routinely manipulate
such disparity in bargaining to coerce patients into accepting voluntary commitment
status (thus avoiding court hearings), see Susan A. Reed & Dan A. Lewis, The Negotiation of Voluntary Admission in Chicago's State Mental Hospitals, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 137 (1990); see also Joel Haycock, Mediating the Gap: Thinking About Alternatives
to the Current Practice of Civil Commitment, 20 ]NEw

ENG. J. CRIM.

& CrV.

CONFINE-

265, 278 (1994) ("[The patient's lawyers], in collusion with the care-givers, disempower him or her and effectively thwart the establishment of a voluntary treatment
compact between the patient and mental health professionals.").
173. Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 45, at 115.
174. Juan Ramirez, Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville's Tribute to the Sixth Amendment, 41 CAL. W. L. REv. 103, 119 (2004).
175. See Amy D. Ronner & Bruce J.Winick, Silencing the Appellant's Voice: The
Anti-therapeutic Per CuriamAffirmance, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 499, 503-4 (2000); see
generally Perlin & Dorfman, Wastin' Time, supra note 5.
MENT
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system because of the stigma of a criminal conviction and the possibility
that a defendant found guilty might lose his liberty. Here, especially, if litigants do not "have a chance to tell their story to a decision maker," 17 6 then
therapeutic jurisprudence cannot be present.
Although there was originally significant scholarly interest in the relationship between TJ and competency to stand trial, 177 that interest has
mostly abated in recent years.17 8 TJ was introduced in the early 1990s by
Professors David Wexler and Bruce J. Winick. 179 It was first applied in drug
treatment courts in 1999,180 then extended to domestic violence courts,
mental health courts, re-entry courts, and community courts. 181 It has spread
across all areas of law, including criminal law, family law, health law, torts
law, contracts and commercial law, and trusts and estates.1 8 2 It became a
183
critical centerpiece of analysis of mental health law generally.
A recent article underscores that "the implications of expanding the
scope of the forensic evaluator's role to include therapeutic jurisprudence
objectives more explicitly would require further exploration and discussion
176. Ronner, supra note 167, at 627-28. See also, e.g., Evelyn H. Cruz, Validation
Through Other Means: How Immigration Clinics Can Give Immigrants a Voice When
Bureaucracy Has Left Them Speechless, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 811, 825 n.53 (2005);
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Building a Pedagogy of Problem-Solving: Learning to
Choose Among ADR Processes, 5 HARV.NEGOT. L. REv. 113, 129-31 (2000).
177. See generally Richard Barnum & Thomas Grisso, Competency to Stand Trial
in Juvenile Court in Massachusetts: Issues in TherapeuticJurisprudence,20 NEW ENG.
J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 321 (1994); Ira K. Packer, The Court Clinic System in
Massachusetts:A TherapeuticApproach vs. a Rights-OrientedApproach, 20 NEw ENG.
J. ON CRrM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 291 (1994); Bruce J.Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: EsSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW

233, 233 n.1 (Bruce J. Winick ed. 1997).

178. Stunningly, when one searches on WESTLAW for <"tj" "therapeutic jurisprudence" /s forensic & DA (aft 2010)>, other than articles written by Mr. Perlin, there
are only two substantive discussions, see infra notes 184 & 186 and accompanying text,

by other authors.
179. See Michael L. Perlin, "Changing of the Guards":David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence,and the Transformation of Legal Scholarship, 63 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 3-7 (2019).
180. See generally Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the
Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 439 (1999).
181. See BRUCE J. WINICK & DAvID B. WEXLER, JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC

KEY:

(2003).
supra note 1, § 2-6, at 2-55 to 2-63, and nn. 323-77.

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS

182. See

PERLIN & CUCOLO,

183. See supra note 126 and accompanying text; see generally Michael L. Perlin,
"Have You Seen Dignity?": The Story of the Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 27 U.N.Z. LAW REv. 1135 (2017).
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within the profession."' 84 Another observes that "TJ-friendly wine1 8 5 includes forensic mental health experts to determine what treatment the minor
would benefit the most from, effective mental health programs and institu86
tions, and rehabilitation as a genuine objective of the legal process."'
However, there are no considerations of the topics discussed in this paper.
In a series of other papers and books, Mr. Perlin (by himself and with
other colleagues) has identified how our systemic failures similarly violate
TJ. 187 Mr. Perlin has written in this vein about how the fundamental failures
in the interpretation of the CRPD that would abolish the incompetency doctrine (and the insanity defense) grossly violate therapeutic jurisprudence
principles.1 88 In one of those pieces, Mr. Perlin concluded: "I am convinced,
after spending over forty years representing and working closely with per184. Susan Hatters Friedman, et al., How Do Evaluees Hear Testimony? Forensic
1 INT'L J. THERAPEUTIC JuRIs. 59, 67 (2016).

Experts' Views,

185. See David Wexler, New Wine in New Bottles: The Need to Sketch a Therapeutic Jurisprudence 'Code' of Proposed Criminal Processes and Practices, 7 ARIZ.
SUMMIr L. REv. 463, 464 (2012) (explaining the wine-bottle metaphor).

186. Melissa Cintr6n Hernindez, Mentally Ill in the Juvenile Justice System: The
Sequential Intercept Model Approach, 2 INT'L J. THERAPEUTIC JURIs. 61, 89 (20162017).
187. For recent work, see generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 145; PERLIN,
supra note 10; MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIG1HTS AND MENTAL Disc
ABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD (2011); MICHAEL L. PERLIN & ALISON

J. LYNCH, SEXUALITY,

DISABILITY AND THE LAW: BEYOND THE LAST FRONTIER?

(2016); Perlin, Who Will Judge, supra note 9; Perlin, Merchants, supra note 57;
Michael L. Perlin, "I Expected It to Happen!I Knew He'd Lost Control": The Impact of
PTSD on Criminal Sentencing after the Promulgation of DSM-5, 4 UTAH L. REv. 881
(2015); Michael L. Perlin, There's a Dyin' Voice Within Me Reaching out Somewhere:
How Therapeutic JurisprudenceCan Bring Voice to the Teaching of Mental Disability
and Criminal Law, 3 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 37 (2015); Michael L. Perlin, "The Ladder of
the Law Has No Top and No Bottom": How Therapeutic JurisprudenceCan Give Life
to InternationalHuman Rights, 37 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 535 (2014); Perlin, supra

note 4; Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, "Tolling for the Aching Ones Whose
Wounds Cannot Be Nursed": The Marginalizationof Racial Minorities and Women in
Institutional Mental Disability Law, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 431 (2017);
Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "She's Nobody's Child/The Law Can't Touch Her
at All": Seeking to Bring Dignity to Legal Proceedings Involving Juveniles, 56 FAM.
CT. REV. 79 (2018); Lynch & Perlin, supra note 5; Naomi M. Weinstein & Michael L.
Perlin, "Who's Pretending to Care for Him?" How the Endless Jail-to-Hospital-toStreet-Repeat Cycle Deprives Persons with Mental Disabilitiesthe Right to Continuity
of Care, 8 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 455 (2018); Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra
note 10.
188. See generally Perlin, supra note 70.; Perlin & Szeli, Evolution, supra note
70; Perlin & Szeli, Challenges, supra note 70.
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sons with serious mental disabilities in the criminal-justice system, that
[embracing therapeutic jurisprudence] is the only way that we can begin to
eradicate the poison of sanism that contaminates our criminal-justice
system."8'9
The authors adhere to that conclusion today. Beyond this, we believe
that in the context of social benefits law, it is necessary for lawyers representing persons with disabilities to embrace therapeutic jurisprudence principles in an effort to advance "healing and wellness," 190 and to structure
arguments that are consonant with-and not dissonant with-a social
model of disability.
We also must consider the near-global ineffectiveness of counsel in
cases involving persons with mental disabilities from the perspective of
therapeutic jurisprudence. 19' Recently, Mr. Perlin asked-quasi-rhetorically-"to what extent do the ample bodies of case law construing the ineffectiveness assistance of counsel standard established by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Strickland v. Washington 92 even consider the implications of TJ
lawyering?"' 193 To be blunt, with the exception of the now mostly-overruled
Montana case of In re Mental Health of K.G.F.,194 the answer is, sadly, "not
at all." Until courts begin to consider these issues through a therapeutic
jurisprudence filter, it is unlikely there will be any significant ameliorative
change. It is important to recognize that the practice of TJ should not, and
cannot, stop with lawyers. It is essential that other members of the legal
system, including judges, case workers, and judicial staff, be sensitive to the
needs of persons with disabilities, 195 and that they are sensitized to the pop189. Perlin, supra note 70, at 518. Elsewhere, Mr. Perlin has asked: "If a defendant is, in fact, incompetent to stand trial, that means that he does not have 'sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and[/]or a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him;' how can TJ principles be invoked in such a case?" Perlin, supra note 64, at 51617.
190. Winick, supra note 164, at 26.
191. See generally Perlin, Who Will Judge, supra note 9.
192. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (asking "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial
court cannot be relied on as having produced a just result"). See generally PERLIN &
CUCOLO, supra note 1, ch. 6.
193. Perlin & Lynch, Mr. Bad Example, supra note 9, at 319. On the application
of TJ principles to cases relying on Strickland, see Perlin et al., supra note 10, at 81-88.
194. K.G. F., 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001). But see In re J.S., 401 P.3d 197 (Mont.
2017) (partially overruling K.G.F.); see generally PERLIN & CucoLo, supra note 1, § 63.3.4, at 640 to 641 (3d ed. 2018).
195. See, e.g., Leslie Larkin Cooney, Giving Millennials a Leg-Up: How to Avoid
the "IfI Knew Then What I Know Now" Syndrome, 96 Ky. L.J. 505, 513 (2007-2008)
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ulation's diverse needs. This will help prevent dismissive and sanist
attitudes.
Finally, Mr. Perlin has suggested often in the past that the use of therapeutic jurisprudence-to strip bare the law's sanist fagade-will become a
powerful tool that will serve as "a means of attacking and uprooting 'the
we/they distinction that has traditionally plagued and stigmatized the mentally disabled'-then that result will be therapeutic: for the legal system, for
1 96
the development of mental disability law, and ultimately, for all of us."'
197
We similarly adhere to that conclusion today.
V.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have sought to bring some measure of coherence to
our discussion of the combined complexities of the law and disability systems, and why navigation of those systems is sometimes so frustrating and
difficult. As we noted earlier, Mr. Perlin was truly surprised when he
learned that no one had yet tackled this important problem. Our hope is that
this paper encourages others-scholars and practitioners alike-to take
these issues seriously.
Many of us, to return to the couplet that gave us the title for this paper,
"feel to moan" when faced with the reality of how persons with disabilities
are treated in the legal system. We hope that, in place of the "waterfalls of
pity" that Dylan writes about in the same couplet, we rise to the challenge
on behalf of these populations. For, in the most often-cited lyric in the song
in question, "He not busy being born is busy dying." 198

("The tenets of TJ espouse a multi-disciplinary approach to law."); Selwyn Fraser, A
Cloak of Many Philosophies:Restorative Justice, Therapeutic Jurisprudence,and Family Empowerment in Aotearoa New Zealand's Youth Justice System, 2 INT'L J. THERAPEUTIC Jurs. 157, 164 (2017) ("The TJ research programme is multi-disciplinary,
outcome-oriented, and grounded in empirical research (especially drawing from the
behavioural sciences).").
196.

MICHAEL
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PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL

301 (2000).
197. See Michael L. Perlin, "Your Corrupt Ways Had Finally Made You Blind":
ProsecutorialMisconduct and the Use of "Ethnic Adjustments" in Death Penalty Cases
of Defendants with Intellectual Disabilities,65 AM. U. L. REV. 1437, 1455 n.95 (2016).
198. Dylan, supra note 18.

